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claimants should not be allowed to do indirectly what they cannot
do directly. 3
Neil A. Abrams

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

CPL § 270.25: Prosecutor'suse of peremptory challenges for sole
purpose of excluding blacks from jury violates criminal defendant's right to trial by an impartialjury
CPL section 270.25 requires a court to exclude from a jury a
prospective juror against whom a peremptory challenge has been
exercised." Since no reason need be given to exercise a peremptory
63 Clearly, were as-of-right amendments to be permitted in all instances, claimants
would be well advised to refrain from interposing claims which are prejudicial to the state
until after the original late filing had been subjected to section 10(6) scrutiny. Irrespective
of whether or under what restrictions amendments to late claims may be interposed, it is
suggested that the practitioner should submit all contemplated actions in the original filing.
Such an approach would be sensible in light of Jones v. State, 51 N.Y.2d 943, 416 N.E.2d
1050, 435 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1980), wherein the Court of Appeals refused to overturn a supreme
court decision which held that a claimant may not amend a technical defect in a late claim.
Id. at 994, 416 N.E.2d at 1050, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 715. Indeed, the distinction between an
amendment to a defective late filing (barred by Jones on a jurisdictional theory) and an
amendment to a valid late filing (permitted by leave of court in Iazzetta) could disappear
should the courts continue to embrace technical pleading requirements. See, e.g., McGaughy
v. State, 55 App. Div. 2d 823, 390 N.Y.S.2d 301 (4th Dep't 1976); Estate of Johnson v. State,
49 App. Div. 2d 136, 373 N.Y.S.2d 671 (3d Dep't 1975); Peterson v. State, 84 Misc. 2d 296,
374 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
CPL § 270.25(1) provides that "[a] peremptory challenge is an objection to a prospective juror for which no reason need be assigned. Upon any peremptory challenge, the
court must exclude the person challenged from service." CPL § 270.25(1) (1971). HistoricallI,, the peremptory challenge existed only for the benefit and protection of the defendant.
People v. McQuade, 110 N.Y. 284, 294, 18 N.E. 156, 159 (1888). Blackstone described the
peremptory challenge as "a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for

which our English laws are justly famous." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, ComrNTARmEs 346 (1st ed.

1769). But cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 213 (1965) (suggesting peremptory challenges
could be exercised by both sides at common law).
In New York, such challenges were not granted to the prosecution until the middle of
the nineteenth century. J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 148-49 (1977). Today,
peremptory challenges are a statutory right and can be exercised by the prosecution and the
defendant in all state and federal courts. Id. at 281-84; FED. R. CRM. P. 24(b). Although the
use of a peremptory challenge is a substantial right given a defendant, People v. McQuade,
110 N.Y. 284, 293, 18 N.E. 156, 158 (1888); People v. Hamlin, 9 App. Div. 2d 173, 174, 192
N.Y.S.2d 870, 871 (3d Dep't 1959), it does not rise to the level of a constitutional right,
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), and "rests entirely with the Legislature." People v. Lobel, 298 N.Y. 243, 257, 82 N.E.2d 145, 152 (1948); People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409,
426, 159 N.E. 379, 385 (1927); People v. King, 47 App. Div. 2d 594, 595, 363 N.Y.S.2d 682,
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challenge, 5 it has been used by prosecutors to exclude blacks froin
6
the petit jury despite the most obvious of discriminatory motives.
This practice almost invariably has been upheld notwithstanding
the constitutional requirement that a criminal defendant be tried
by an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of
the community. 7 Recently, however, in People v. Thompson,"s the
683 (4th Dep't 1975).
"' The chief characteristic of the peremptory challenge is that it requires no explanation and permits no inquiry as to the reason for its use. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220
(1965). Blackstone defined the peremptory challenge as an "arbitrary and capricious species
of challenge to a certain number of jurors, without showing any cause at all." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

346 (1st ed. 1769).

Additionally, the aim of the peremptory challenge is to remove "extremes of partiality
on both sides [and] to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will
decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). The peremptory challenge permits a prosecutor or defense
counsel to eliminate jurors whom they believe will not be favorable to their case and whom
could not be shown to be actually or impliedly biased and thus excusable for cause. Note,
The Defendant's Right to Object to ProsecutorialMisuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1770, 1774 (1979). The challenge often is used to excuse a juror who may have
become hostile due to vigorous questioning at the voir dire. See id.; Comment, People v.
Wheeler: California's Answer to Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 16 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 897, 903 (1979).
11 Because its use is unrestrained, the peremptory challenge is the most effective tool of
a prosecutor seeking to compose a "favorable" jury. If the prosecutor wishes to keep blacks
off a jury, he may do so by peremptorily challenging each one, despite the most obvious of
discriminatory motives. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 151-52 (1977); Kuhn,
Jury Discrimination:The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 283-84 (1968); Comment, The
Prosecutor'sExercise of the PeremptoryChallenge To Exclude Nonwhite Jurors:A Valued
Common Law Privilege In Conflict With The Equal Protection Clause, 46 U. CIN. L. REV.
554, 559 (1977); Comment, The Prohibition of Group-Based Stereotypes in Jury Selection
Procedures,25 VILL. L. REV. 339, 339 (1980).
"' The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part that: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.
... U.S. CoNsT. amend.
VI. The sixth amendment has been made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Additionally, the New York State Constitution reinforces the defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury. See Stokes v. People, 53 N.Y. 164, 171 (1873); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 12 (McKinney 1976).
Since the Supreme Court has declared that a prosecutor is presumed to exercise the
challenges to obtain an impartial jury, the use of peremptory challenges to eliminate blacks
from the petit jury traditionally has been upheld as constitutional. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1965); United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40, 43 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 853 (1948); United States ex rel. Dixon v. Cavell, 284 F. Supp. 535, 537 (E.D.
Pa. 1968); Watts v. State, 53 Ala. App. 518, 301 So. 2d 280, 283 (Crim. App. 1974); People v.
King, 54 Ill. 2d 291, 296 N.E.2d 731, 735 (1973).
The Supreme Court has construed the sixth and fourteenth amendments to afford a
state criminal defendant the right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the commu-
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Appellate Division, Second Department, held that a prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges for the sole purpose of excluding
blacks from a jury violates the criminal defendant's right to trial
by an impartial jury.69
At the trial of a black defendant,"° the prosecutor employed
all twelve of his available peremptory challenges against prospective black jurors.7 1 After the jurors were sworn, the defendant
moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor had used
his peremptory challenges systematically to exclude blacks from
the jury panel. 2 Upon denial of the motion,73 the all white jury
convicted the defendant of criminal possession of stolen property.7 4
nity. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); People v. Parks, 41 N.Y.2d 36, 42, 359
N.E.2d 358, 364, 390 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (1976). The Constitution, however, does not require
that "petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 538. Rather, it mandates
that the jury venires or pools of names from which the jurors are selected must not systematically exclude cognizable groups from the community. Id.
*8 79 App. Div. 2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (2d Dep't 1981).
60 Id. at 88, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 741. The Thompson court based its decision on the criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury as derived from the New York State Constitution.
Id. at 96, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 746. The constitution provides that "[n]o member of this state
shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen
thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers. . . ." N.Y. CONST. Art.
I, § 1. The defendant's right to an impartial jury explicitly is provided for in section 12 of
the Civil Rights Law which provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a
right to a ... trial, by an impartial jury." N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 12 (McKinney 1976). See
also Stokes v. People, 53 N.Y. 164, 171 (1873).
70 The defendant was charged with criminal possession of stolen property in the first
degree and grand larceny in the second degree as a result of an automobile theft. 79 App.
Div. 2d at 88, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
71 Id. Pursuant to CPL 270.25(2)(c), the prosecution and the defendant were each authorized to use 10 peremptory challenges for "regular" jurors and two for each alternate
jurol since the crime charged was a class D felony. The statute increases the number of
peremptory challenges available to each sidb for "regular" jurors as the severity of the highest crime charged increases. Thus, each party would be entitled to 20 challenges if the highest crime charged were a class A felony, 15 if the highest crime charged were a class B or
class C felony, and 10 in all other cases. CPL § 270.25(2) (1971). In the instant case, the
prosecutor's use of all his peremptory challenges to excuse prospective black jurors resulted
in an all white jury. People v. Thompson, 79 App. Div. 2d at 88 n.3, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 742 n.3.
72 79 App. Div. 2d at 88, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
73 The trial court concluded that although the Assistant District Attorney indeed had
purposely excluded blacks from the jury who would have been "fair and impartial," "the law
[was] clear" that the motivation underlying the exercise of peremptory challenges was not
subject to question or scrutiny. Id. at 89, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
"' Id. at 89-90, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 743. After the guilty verdict was rendered, the defense
counsel made a motion to set aside the verdict on the same ground as the motion for mistrial. The Assistant District Attorney responded to the motion by asserting that the constitution permitted the People to systematically exclude members of a group without provid-
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On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held
that because the defendant had established a substantial likelihood that race had formed the sole basis for the prosecutor's use of
his peremptory challenges, the trial court committed reversible error in declining to question the prosecutor's motives. 75 Asserting
that the court is not bound by interpretations of the federal Constitution when construing its own state constitution," Justice
Margett, writing for the majority,7 7 refused to follow Swain v. Alabama a Supreme Court decision which held that the equal protection clause does not mandate an inquiry into the prosecutor's
reasons for using peremptory challenges to eliminate blacks from a
jury.79 Rather, the court relied upon Taylor v. Louisiana,0 in
ing any explanation. Denying the motion, the trial judge reiterated emphatically that he was
bound by the existing law to hold that the prosecutor's actions were not unlawful. At this
point the Assistant District Attorney stated, for the first time, that it was not his intent to
systematically exclude blacks from the jury. Id. at 90, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
7 Id. at 111, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
71 Id. at 92, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 744. A state may provide more stringent protections for
defendants than are afforded to federal defendants. Id.; see Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69,
79, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1194, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 174-75 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984
(1980); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 519, 378 N.E.2d 78, 82, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718
(1978); see, e.g., People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 235, 406 N.E.2d 471, 473, 428 N.Y.S.2d
655, 657 (1980); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483-84, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d
419, 422 (1976). See also Comment, The Prohibitionof Group-Based Stereotypes in Jury
Selection Procedures, 25 VILL. L. REv. 339, 355 (1980).
The Thompson court noted that Swain was decided upon equal protection grounds and
not upon the sixth amendment, which is the federal provision corresponding to the state
constitutional guarantee at issue. 79 App. Div. 2d at 93, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
7
Justices Hopkins and Gibbons joined Justice Margett in the majority. Justice Titone
concurred in the dissent authored by Justice Mangano.
78 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
71 79 App. Div. 2d at 91-92, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 744. In Swain v. Alabama, the prosecutor
peremptorily challenged all six black prospective jurors in the trial of a black defendant. 380
U.S. at 210. The Court rejected the defendant's assertion that the prosecutor's action infringed upon his rights under the equal protection clause because to hold otherwise would
"entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the challenge." Id. at 221-22. The
Court noted that the peremptory challenge often legitimately can be "exercised on grounds
normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion,
nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty" and thus declared
that an inquiry into the prosecutor's reasons in a particular case is not constitutionally mandated. Id. at 221. The Court further stated that in any given case the prosecutor is presumed to be using the challenges to "obtain a fair and impartial jury." Id. at 222. Although
the presumption cannot be overcome with proof that potential jurors were challenged in a
particular case because they were black, the Court noted in dictum that it may be rebutted
when the defendant demonstrates that the prosecutor systematically has used the challenges
to exclude blacks in case after case. Id. at 223-24.
To date, it has been virtually impossible for any defendant challenging a prosecutor's
use of peremptories to meet the "systematic exclusion" test of Swain. Despite numerous
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which the Supreme Court held that the systematic exclusion of women from the jury venire violates a criminal defendant's sixth
amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community."1 The Thompson court reasoned that this
principle should be extended to apply to the selection of petit jurors because the exclusion of cognizable groups from the petit jury
and from the jury venire has the same discriminatory impact.8 2
charges of discrimination, no federal court has ever found the Swain presumption to be
overcome. Note, The Defendant's Right to Object to ProsecutorialMisuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1770, 1770 (1979); see, e.g., United States v. Newman, 549
F.2d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40, 42 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); United States v. Carlton, 456 F.2d 207, 208 (5th Cir. 1972). Only
one state court has held that the Swain burden of proof was met. See State v. Brown, 371
So. 2d 751, 754 (La. 1979).
The Swain decision has been criticized because it allegedly has perpetuated white control of the Southern judicial machinery and has violated the equal protection clause's prohibition against exclusion of blacks from the jury pool. See, e.g., J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION
PROCEDURES 56-58 (1977); Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro
Defendant and his Peerless Jury, 4 Hous. L. REV. 448 (1966); Comment, The Prosecutor's
Exercise of the Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Nonwhite Jurors: A Valued Common
Law Privilege in Conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 554 (1977);
Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A ConstitutionalBlueprint for the Perpetuationof the AllWhite Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966).
80 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
79 App. Div. 2d at 100, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 749. In Taylor, a state statute excluded
women from jury service unless the woman filed a written statement of her desire to serve as
a juror. 419 U.S. at 523. Consequently, virtually all women were excluded from the jury
venire. See id. at 524. The defendant appealed his conviction by an all male jury. Holding
that the exclusion of women had unconstitutionally deprived the defendant of a proper jury,
the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction. The Court declared that the "broad
representative character of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance of a diffused
impartiality and partly because sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic
responsibility." Id. at 530-31 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). Furthermore, the Court stated that large distinctive groups or
identifiable segments of the community cannot constitutionally be excluded from the jury
pool. Id. at 530. Thus, it appears that the Taylor Court did not intend that the application
of its decision be limited solely to the systematic exclusion of women from jury service.
82 79 App. Div. 2d at 101, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 749. Whether it occurs with respect to the
jury venire or the petit jury, the systematic exclusion of cognizable groups prevents the
achievement of an impartial jury and the rightful participation of all races in the trial process. Id. The Thompson court emphasized the importance of attaining a "diffused impartiality" which is an element of an "impartial jury." See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 530.
When a significant portion of an identifiable group is excluded from jury service, the result
is to "[deprive] the jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented," Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972),
thus preventing the achievement of "diffused impartiality." 79 App. Div. 2d at 102, 435
N.Y.S.2d at 750. Furthermore, the court contended that the state constitution may require
the achievement of "diffused impartiality" through its very language. Id. at 103, 435,
N.Y.S.2d at 750. The state constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his
rights "unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers. . . ." N.Y. CONST. art. 1,
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In formulating a standard for determining whether peremptory challenges had been discriminatorily employed, 83 the court
stated that the prosecutor initially is presumed to be exercising the
challenges in a permissible manner.84 To rebut this presumption,
the defendant must show that the excluded jurors are members of
a racial group, and that there is a "substantial likelihood" that
these persons were excluded solely because of their race, rather
§ 1. The court also stated that it considered jury service by members of all racial groups as
important as the attainment of "diffused impartiality," because such service "fosters the
confidence of the parties and the public in our criminal justice system." 79 App. Div. 2d at
103, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 751. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Note, Limiting
the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715,
1730 (1977). The Thompson court declared, however, that it did not mandate that "petit
juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups
in the population." 79 App. Div. 2d at 104, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 538). But see 79 App. Div. 2d at 113, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 757 (Mangano, J.,
dissenting). The court further noted that Taylor's basic tenet already had been accepted by
the New York courts, see People v. Parks, 41 N.Y.2d 36, 42, 359 N.E.2d 358, 364, 390
N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (1976), and by the legislature. See 79 App. Div. 2d at 100, 435 N.Y.S.2d at
749; N.Y. JUD. LAW § 500 (McKinney Supp. 1980); Memorandum of Office of Court Administration, reprinted in [1977] N.Y. Laws 2617-2618 (McKinney).
83 In determining whether peremptory challenges were made on a discriminatory basis,
the Thompson court patterned its decision after People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d
748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). In Wheeler, the California Supreme Court held that under
the California Constitution, the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors for reasons
predicated solely on group bias violates the right to a jury drawn from a representative
cross-section of the community. Id. at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
Ruling that the trial judge had erred in failing to consider whether the prosecutor's reasons
were based exclusively on group bias, the Wheeler court reversed the convictions of two
black defendants who had been tried by all white juries. Id. at 283, 583 P.2d at 766, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 907. In addition to Thompson, two other state courts have approved the Wheeler
rationale and remedy. See Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516-18 (Mass.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin, 612 P.2d 716, 718 (N.M. 1980).
84 79 App. Div. 2d at 108, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 753. Several policy considerations underlie
the presumption that the prosecutor is using the challenges in a constitutionally permissible
manner. These include a desire to achieve impartiality, the public's interest in the efficient
administration of trials and the respect traditionally accorded to counsel as officers of the
court. Id. at 107-08, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
The Thompson court emphasized that if the defendant believes that the prosecutor is
impermissibly excluding blacks, he must make a motion for mistrial early, at the risk of
waiver. The court noted that double jeopardy rarely will be threatened if the motion is
timely made "since jeopardy does not attach until the entire jury has been impaneled and
sworn." Id. at 108 n.19, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 753 n.19. Furthermore, the defendant must create a
thorough and complete record in support of his assertions. Id. at 108, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walker, 397 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (1979). This should include a
transcript of the relevant portions of the voir dire. Although no record of the voir dire was
made in the Thompson case, the court noted that the uncontroverted facts and the trial
judge's comments clearly established that the prosecutor's motivation was to exclude persons solely on the basis of race. 79 App. Div. 2d at 111 n.22, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 755 n.22.
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than for any specific bias relating to the case. 85 If such a substantial likelihood exists,86 the burden shifts to the prosecutor to
demonstrate that the peremptory challenges were not exercised exclusively on the basis of race.8 7 If the prosecutor fails to meet this
burden, 8 the court must dismiss the jurors selected, quash the venire, and start the selection process once again.8 9
Writing for the dissent, Justice Mangano agreed with the majority regarding the necessity to curtail the use of racial bias as a
means of excluding petit jurors from service.9 0 Justice Mangano argued, however, that the majority was not justified in extending the
principle underlying the prohibition of systematic exclusion from
the jury venire to encompass the use of peremptory challenges to
the petit jury."1 Such drastic action, in his view, was within the
"179 App. Div. 2d at 108, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 754. The Thompson court noted that the
types of evidence set forth in Wheeler are all relevant to the defendant's case. Id. According
to Wheeler, at least four sets of facts will assist the defendant in rebutting the presumption
that the prosecutor used the challenges in a constitutionally permissible manner: (1) if the
prosecutor has excused most or all of the group members from the venire, or has used an
excessive number of challenges against that group; (2) if the only characteristic the struck
jurors share is membership in that group; (3) if the prosecutor did not properly examine
these jurors at the voir dire or failed to question them at all; and (4) if the defendant is a
member of the same group as the excluded jurors and the victim belongs to the group which
comprises the majority of the remaining jurors. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 280-81,
583 P.2d 748, 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 905-06 (1978). A significant distinction, however, is
that the language of the Thompson decision limits its holding to exclusions based on race
while the Wheeler decision prohibits the intentional exclusion of the members of any identifiable group.
16 79 App. Div. 2d at 108-09, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 754. If the trial judge finds a "substantial
likelihood" that the challenges were racially motivated does not exist, thef' no questions
may be asked of the prosecutor. Id.
87 Id. at 109, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 754. To meet his burden of proof, the prosecutor need not
demonstrate that his reasons for the use of the peremptory challenge at issue "rise to the
level of a challenge for cause." People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 281-82, 583 P.2d 748, 765,
148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 906 (1978); 79 App. Div. 2d at 109, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 754. All that need be
shown is that the challenges were used for reasons related to the particular case, parties, or
witnesses or to the individual characteristics of the prospective juror apart from his race.
People v. Thompson, 79 App. Div. 2d at 109, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
Is The trial judge normally will decide whether the prosecutor has met his burden of
proof on the basis of his observations of the jury selection, counsel's arguments and the
prosecutor's explanations. A hearing may be appropriate only in the exceptional case. 79
App. Div. 2d at 109, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
89 Id. at 109-10, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 754-55. Because the party has the right to a complete
venire, the venire must be quashed when it has been fleeced clean of "members of a cognizable group by the improper use of peremptory challenges." Id. at 109, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 754
(quoting People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282, 583 P.2d 748, 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 906
(1978)).
79 App. Div. 2d at 114, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 757 (Mangano, J., dissenting).
91 Id.
at 113, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 757 (Mangano, J., dissenting). Justice Mangano ques-
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province of the legislature.92

The Thompson court has endeavored to limit the discriminatory effects of the prosecutor's statutory right to exercise peremptory challenges by carving out an exception to this hitherto inviolate rule."' While the court's aim of assuring jury impartiality is
highly commendable, it is submitted that the decision poses a significant danger of unlimited expansion in subsequent cases. For
example, it appears that the court rationally cannot confine its
holding solely to racially based exclusions. 4 It is submitted that if
the use of peremptory challenges to purposely exclude black jurors
violates a defendant's right to an impartial jury, the exclusion of
other cognizable groups would also violate that right.9 5 Thus, it is
tioned the majority's interpretation of an impartial jury, noting that according to Taylor the
meaning of an "impartial" petit jury is not synonymous with the requirement of a fair crosssection of the community. Rather, he reasoned, an impartial petit jury is one which will
decide the case solely on the basis of the evidence presented. Id. at 113-14, 435 N.Y.S.2d at
757 (Mangano, J., dissenting)(citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)). Justice
Mangano further contended that the "substantial likelihood" test was too uncertain and
vague to be amenable to objective application by the individual trial judges. 79 App. Div. 2d
at 114-15, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 757-58. (Mangano, J., dissenting).
92 79 App. Div. 2d at 115, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 758 (Mangano, J., dissenting). The dissent
took the view that the majority had "rewritten" CPL 270.25, thus altering the very nature
and purpose of the peremptory challenge, which by its definition requires no explanation.
Id. at 114, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 757 (Mangano, J., dissenting). Justice Mangano warned that
such judicial legislation is "fraught with dangerous consequences for the efficient administration of criminal justice." Id. at 115, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 758 (Mangano, J., dissenting); see
Bright Homes, Inc. v. Wright, 8 N.Y.2d 157, 162, 168 N.E.2d 515, 517, 203 N.Y.S.2d 67, 70
(1960); Austin v. Board of Higher Educ., 5 N.Y.2d 430, 443-44, 158 N.E.2d 681, 688, 186
N.Y.S.2d 1, 12 (1959).
93 See note 65 supra.
94 Although the Thompson court was influenced greatly by the rationale of People v.
Wheeler, 122 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978), the holdings in the two
cases differ significantly. In Wheeler, the California Supreme Court held that a prosecutor
cannot challenge a juror solely because that juror is a member of any identifiable group, id.
at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903, while the Thompson court limited its
decision to black jurors.
11 The requirement that an impartial jury be drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community, see note 68 supra, cannot be achieved if members of any identifiable or "cognizable" group are systematically excluded. See People v. Wheeler, 122 Cal. 3d at 276, 583
P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03; Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d
499, 515, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); People v. Kagan, 101 Misc. 2d 274, 277, 420
N.Y.S.2d 987, 989 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), afl'd on other grounds, 441 N.Y.S.2d 256
(1st Dep't 1981). In Kagan, the court held that peremptory challenges which are used to
systematically exclude jurors solely because of their "sex, race, color, creed or national origin, where the persons excluded are affiliated with the same ethnic group as the defendant"
is a violation of the right to a trial by one's peers. Id. at 277, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 989. The
Kagan court concluded, however, that four peremptory challenges of Jewish persons was
insufficient to establish a violation. Id. at 278, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 990. In Taylor v. Louisiana,
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probable that in similar cases courts will rely upon the Thompson
rationale to prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to exclude
members of any cognizable group.9 6
Additionally, it is questionable whether Thompson fairly can
grant the defendant the right to object to the prosecutor's misuse
of peremptory challenges without granting the prosecutor the same
right when a defendant abuses the challenges.9 7 Should the issue
arise, it appears likely that Thompson will be extended further to
require inquiry into the defendant's reasons for the discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges.9 8 Another potentially ripe sphere for
expansion and application of the Thompson holding is that of civil
litigation. Although discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge would seem to create more serious consequences in the criminal area where the liberty of the defendant is at stake, such abuse
may also seriously harm the civil litigant, whose property may well
419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Supreme Court noted that "[r]estricting jury service to only special
groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be
squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial." Id. at 530. Thus, it does not seem that
the Thompson court, which relied upon Taylor in formulating its decision, logically can
limit its holding to the discriminatory challenge of black jurors only.
9 See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
The Thompson court did not discuss whether the prosecutor may object to the defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. The Wheeler court, however, noted
in dictum that "the People no less than individual defendants are entitled to a trial by an
impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. . . . [T]o hold
to the contrary would frustrate other essential functions served by the requirement of crosssectionalism." People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr.
at 906 n.29. The other essential functions include "legitimating the judgments of ie courts,
promoting citizen participation in government, and preventing further stigmatizing of minority groups." Id. at 267 n.6, 583 P.2d at 755 n.6, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896 n.6. See also Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d at 517 n.35.
9" See note 97 and accompanying text supra. It may be argued that the prosecutor
should not be permitted to object to the defendant's unfettered use of peremptory challenges since such challenges historically existed for the benefit of the defendant. See People
v. Thompson, 79 App. Div. 2d at 98-99, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 748; Brown, McGuire & Winters,
The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: TraditionalUse
or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV. 192, 233 (1978); note 1 supra. See also Note, The Defendant's Right to Object to ProsecutorialMisuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARv. L.
REV. 1770, 1785-87 (1979).
" In People v. Wheeler, the court declined to resolve the question of whether its decision was applicable to civil cases. 22 Cal. 3d at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr.
at 906 n.29. Several commentators, however, have maintained that Wheeler should be extended to civil litigation. See, e.g., Comment, People v. Wheeler; California'sAnswer to
Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 897, 905-09 (1979); Note, Group
Bias-An Improper Ground for the Peremptory Challenge in California, 12 Loy. U.L.A.L.
REv. 747, 762 (1979).
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be at stake.' 0
Apart from the danger that the scope of application of the
Thompson decision will be unduly expanded, it is submitted that
it will prove to be ineffective to prevent the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges. Having been warned by the Thompson
court that they must have a valid reason for excluding blacks from
a jury, prosecutors will be certain to provide such reasons.' 0 For
example, a prosecutor might intentionally alienate a juror during
the voir dire and then exercise a peremptory challenge for the
facially valid reason that the juror is specifically biased. 0 2 It is
submitted that a prosecutor also could circumvent Thompson by
permitting only one black juror to remain on the panel, thereby
thwarting a showing that the challenges were based solely on
race. 0 3 Finally, it is suggested that the result in Thompson will
delay further the already laborious process of jury selection by
sanctioning what is sure to become a routine dilatory tactic. Defense attorneys will now move for a mistrial whenever a prosecutor
uses his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks.
Thus, due to the unlikelihood of its effectiveness, it is con100In New York, each party in a civil action is permitted three peremptory challenges
for regular jurors and one peremptory challenge for each alternate juror. CPLR 4109 (Supp.
1980-1981). In civil actions, a jury is composed of six persons, rather than twelve as in criminal actions. Due to the reduced number of challenges available, a civil litigant is less able to
shape the composition of the final panel than is a criminal defendant or prosecutor. Thus, it
is submitted that there is a much less urgent need to extend the Thompson decision to civil
litigation.
101 One of the traditionally acceptable uses of the peremptory challenge is to permit the
party to excuse a juror who may have become predisposed against that party during the voir
dire interrogation. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 275 n.16, 583 P.2d at 761 n.16, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 902 n.16; note 65 supra. An inherent danger of the Wheeler decision is that
prosecutors may begin to abuse this acceptable motive. Conversely, the trial judge may not
believe a prosecutor who has unintentionally alienated a juror during the voir dire and legitimately wishes to use his peremptory challenge.
102 See note 101 supra.
103 On the same day that the Thompson decision was issued, the Appellate Division,
Second Department, also decided People v. Goodrich, 80 App. Div. 2d 562, 435 N.Y.S.2d 758
(2d Dep't 1981), a case in which the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges was alleged
to be discriminatory. In Goodrich the prosecutor used thirteen peremptory challenges, seven
against blacks and six against whites, with the result that one black was seated on the jury.
Id. at 562, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 758. Unlike the situation in Thompson, the trial judge in Goodrich did not find that the prosecutor was purposely excluding blacks. Id. at 562, 435
N.Y.S.2d at 758-59. Based on these facts, the Goodrich court distinguished Thompson and
held that there was not a substantial likelihood that the challenges were based only on race.
Id. at 563, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 759. It is submitted that Goodrich demonstrates that a prosecutor may avoid the result in Thompson by excluding all but one black from jury service, at
least where his peremptory challenges exclude equal proportions of whites and blacks.
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tended that the Thompson decision has not altered the "very essence and nature" of the peremptory challenge, as argued by the
dissent.1 4 The decision, however, does lay the foundation for the
erosion of the peremptory challenge through judicial expansion of
the Thompson holding. 1

5

Moreover, the court's remedy for the

discriminatory use of peremptory challenges appears to be open to
circumvention through prosecutorial stratagem. 10 6 Commentators
have suggested a number of alternate solutions which may be more
effective to halt the abuse of peremptory challenges.10 7 In light of

the purpose and policy underlying the statutory right to exercise
peremptory challenges, 10° it is suggested that the best alternative
would be to reduce the number of peremptory challenges available
to each side. Thus, a prosecutor still may eliminate the few jurors
whom he deems unfavorable, if not specifically biased. While significantly reducing the prosecutor's ability to eliminate all blacks
from a jury, 0 9 this alternative would preserve the basic objective
,01 See notes 65 & 92 and accompanying text supra.
105 See notes 94-100 supra. Should the Thompson holding be expanded, the number of
situations in which a party's reasons for exercising peremptory challenges may be subjected
to inquiry will increase substantially. Thus, this type of challenge, which by its very definition is "arbitrary" and "not admitting of question," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1295 (rev. 4th
ed. 1968), will no longer be peremptory.
101 See notes 101 & 102 and accompanying text supra.
107 J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 166-69 (1977). Professor Van Dyke discusses a number of proposals which may help to remedy the abuse of peremptory challenges. One suggestion is to withhold from the prosecution the right to use any peremptory
challenges at all. Another would be to bar the use of peremptory challenges by both the
prosecution and the defense. Id.
108 See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
109See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 107, at 166-69. Professor Van Dyke asserts that most
states, including New York, provide for an excessive number of peremptory challenges. He
urges states to follow the New Mexico procedure of granting the prosecution three peremptory challenges and the defense five. This system, he maintains, is more than sufficient to
permit the elimination of the truly biased juror and would prevent counsel from changing
the random nature of the jury. It is submitted that New York prosecutors realistically do
not require ten to twenty peremptory challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury. The
prosecutor should be able to eliminate the great majority of biased jurors through the voir
dire. The net effect of providing for such a great number of challenges has been to permit
the prosecutor to obtain a jury that is partial to the victim rather than a jury that is partial
to neither side. Reducing the number of challenges, it is contended, will force the prosecutor
to use the few available challenges in a more prudent manner-to excuse jurors who truly
seem biased rather than to use them for the wholesale elimination of black citizens from
jury service.
Recognizing that peremptory challenges may not further the goal of juries drawn from a
fair cross-section of the community, the United States Supreme Court proposed an amendment to the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b) which would lower the number of
peremptory challenges granted to prosecutors and to defendants. H.R. Doc. No. 94-464,
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and character of the peremptory challenge. Since the peremptory
challenge is a purely statutory right,110 however, it is suggested
that this remedy properly should be addressed by the legislature
rather than by the judiciary."'
Ziporah J. Szydlo

REAL PROPERTY LAW

Real Prop. Law § 235-b: Implied warranty of habitability held
applicable to cooperative housing
Section 235-b of the Real Property Law appends to residential
leases an implied warranty that leased premises are fit for human
habitation." 2 Although this warranty of habitability clearly applies
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976). While the amendment did not pass, it reflects an acknowledgment by the Supreme Court that an excessive number of peremptory challenges may foster
the creation of unrepresentative juries. For a discussion of the proposal see Note, The Defendant's Right To Object To ProsecutorialMisuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARv.
L. REv. 1770, 1774-76 (1979).
1O See note 64 supra.
"
002

See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
Section 235-b provides in part:

1. In every written or oral lease or rental agreement for residential premises
the landlord or lessor shall be deemed to covenant and warrant that the premises
so leased or rented and all areas used in connection therewith in common with
other tenants or residents are fit for human habitation and for the uses reasonably
intended by the parties and that the occupants of such premises shall not be subjected to any conditions which would be dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to
their life, health or safety. When any such condition has been caused by the misconduct of the tenant or lessee or persons under his direction or control, it shall
not constitute a breach of such covenants and warranties.
2. Any agreement by a lessee or tenant of a dwelling waiving or modifying his
rights as set forth in this section shall be void as contrary to public policy.
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
At early common law, a lease was viewed as a conveyance of an estate in real property.
Park West Mgt. Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 322, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1291, 418 N.Y.S.2d
310, 313, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979); 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 1 221[1] (P. Rohan
ed. 1977); see, e.g., Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 62, 67 (1809). The only defense to a nonpayment
of rent action was the lessor's failure to provide for the quiet enjoyment of the lessee's land.
47 N.Y.2d at 322, 391 N.E.2d at 1291, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 313; L. JONES, LANDLORD AND TENANT
§ 364 (1906). Absent an express agreement requiring the landlord to make repairs, the tenant took the premises as he found them. Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 115, 23 N.E. 126,
127 (1889); see Comment, Landlord-Tenant-CaveatEmptor-Implied Warranty of Habitability in ResidentialLeases-Tonetti v. Penati, 21 N.Y.L.F. 613, 616 (1976). Even with a
repairs agreement, a breach of this duty was not a ground to withhold rent. 47 N.Y.2d at
323, 391 N.E.2d at 1291, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 313; Comment, supra, at 616; see Kaufman v.
Tarulli, 136 N.Y.S. 36, 36 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1912). Eventually, however, the lower

